What exactly *is* a pun, from a metaphysical perspective? This paper delves into the philosophical underpinnings of puns, arguing that traditional type-token views of words lead to an indeterminacy problem when considering these linguistic devices. The author proposes an alternative account based on nominalist views of words, offering a novel solution to this philosophical puzzle. The paper critically examines the type-token view, highlighting its limitations in capturing the essence of puns. It argues that this framework struggles to adequately explain the multiple meanings and interpretations inherent in a successful pun. In contrast, the nominalist account provides a more robust framework for understanding the metaphysical nature of puns. By offering a fresh perspective on the metaphysics of puns, this paper contributes to ongoing debates in philosophy of language and metaphysics. It challenges conventional wisdom and opens new avenues for exploring the complex relationship between language, meaning, and humor.
Published in Synthese, a journal dedicated to the advancement of analytic philosophy, this paper engages with fundamental questions about language and meaning. By exploring the metaphysics of puns, the paper aligns with the journal's focus on rigorous philosophical inquiry and contributes to ongoing discussions in the field.