Devitt, Michael. “Are Unconceived Alternatives a Problem for Scientific Realism?”. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, vol. 42, no. 2, 2011, pp. 285-93, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-011-9166-9.
Devitt, M. (2011). Are Unconceived Alternatives a Problem for Scientific Realism?. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 42(2), 285-293. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-011-9166-9
Devitt M. Are Unconceived Alternatives a Problem for Scientific Realism?. Journal for General Philosophy of Science. 2011;42(2):285-93.
The first research to cite this article was titled The Role of Metaphysical Naturalism in Science and was published in 2011. The most recent citation comes from a 2021 study titled The Role of Metaphysical Naturalism in Science . This article reached its peak citation in 2016 , with 9 citations.It has been cited in 20 different journals, 15% of which are open access. Among related journals, the Synthese cited this research the most, with 6 citations. The chart below illustrates the annual citation trends for this article.