Can consumer boycotts to protect specific fish species sometimes backfire? This provocative study questions the effectiveness of demand-side measures, such as consumer boycotts and aquaculture promotion, in conserving fishery stocks, arguing that these measures can paradoxically increase fishing effort and accelerate stock depletion. The research examines the commercial fishing industry's economics, suggesting that decreasing demand can perversely incentivize increased industry effort. The authors test this proposition using a panel data set from the New England fishery, spanning several species over two decades. The findings challenge conventional wisdom on fishery conservation, suggesting that demand-side efforts may exacerbate the problem they intend to solve. The study concludes that effective fishery conservation requires supply-side regulation, such as quotas. Its implications extend to policymakers and environmental groups, highlighting the need for careful consideration of market dynamics in environmental policy design. Keywords: fishery conservation, consumer boycotts, aquaculture, environmental politics.
Published in Global Environmental Politics, this article addresses key themes of international relations and environmental science. By examining the unintended consequences of consumer boycotts, the paper contributes to the journal's focus on the complex interplay between politics and environmental issues. The study adds a perspective that is grounded in the realities of commercial fishing.