Why do individuals sometimes act against the common good? This review delves into the study of social dilemmas, exploring the tension between individual and collective rationality. In a social dilemma, individually reasonable behavior results in a situation where everyone is worse off. The review categorizes and models social dilemmas, examining key two-person (Prisoner's Dilemma, Assurance, Chicken) and multiple-person scenarios (public goods dilemmas and commons dilemmas). It then presents an extended treatment of potential solutions, organized into motivational, strategic, and structural categories, based on assumptions about egoistic actors and the possibility of changing the situation's structure. Motivational solutions involve non-egoistic actors, while strategic solutions assume egoistic actors without changing the situation’s structure. Structural solutions change the rules of the game. The review concludes with a discussion of current research and future directions, making it valuable to those working in the social sciences. The findings highlight the significance of altering motivational, strategic, or structural elements to foster cooperation and improve outcomes for all involved.
Published in the Annual Review of Sociology, this article contributes to the journal’s broad coverage of sociological theory and research. By providing a comprehensive overview of social dilemmas and potential solutions, it aligns with the journal's goal of presenting insightful analyses of fundamental social processes to a wide audience of sociologists and social scientists.