Can we truly grasp social learning without the complex concept of imitation? This research delves into alternative learning mechanisms, proposing that most can be understood through *priming*, where input amplifies stored internal representations. The study challenges the notion of imitation as a singular "special faculty," suggesting it operates at different levels, particularly in great apes. Focusing on voluntary, learned behavior organized hierarchically, the research highlights two distinct levels: the detailed "action level" and the broader "program level," encompassing subroutine structure. Program-level imitation emerges as a high-level, constructive mechanism, crucial for efficiently acquiring complex skills. This capability, however, might be less evident in laboratory settings due to the simplicity of the manipulations used. Examples, such as food-preparation techniques in wild gorillas and orangutans undergoing rehabilitation, further illustrate this hierarchical imitation. The paper suggests that great apes may have limitations in their hierarchical planning depth compared to humans. Re-interpreting chimpanzee behavior, the study proposes that great apes can imitate at the program level. This has significant implications for understanding how complex skills are transmitted and learned in both animal and human societies, while action level imitation may have a largely social role, even in humans.
Published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, this paper addresses core themes within the journal's scope, particularly in the fields of psychology and neuroscience. By re-evaluating imitation as a hierarchical process, the research challenges conventional views on social learning and offers fresh perspectives on cognitive development. Its exploration of learning mechanisms and hierarchical behavior directly contributes to the journal's ongoing discourse on brain function and behavior.