Can apes truly understand what others are thinking? This paper tackles the complex question of theory of mind in nonhuman primates, critically evaluating the existing evidence for mental state concepts like "want" and "know" in apes. The research challenges interpretations of primate behavior in areas such as imitation, self-recognition, and deception. It suggests that behaviors often attributed to theory of mind can be explained by simpler, nonmentalistic processes like associative learning. By analyzing observational and experimental studies, the author argues that many conclusions lack rigorous experimental backing, and proposes a novel approach using conditional discrimination training to assess chimpanzees' understanding of "seeing." Ultimately, this paper pushes the field toward more rigorous experimental design, urging researchers to find novel ways to distinguish between genuine theory of mind and behaviors driven by basic learning mechanisms. The findings have implications for how we understand animal cognition and the evolution of social intelligence.
Published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, this paper directly engages with core topics in cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind. The journal is known for its focus on interdisciplinary research and commentary, and this paper adds to the ongoing debate about the cognitive capacities of nonhuman primates and the nature of consciousness. The study's citations reflect a broad engagement with literature in animal cognition and developmental psychology.