How can we reconcile identity with change in complex philosophical scenarios? This paper tackles the classic philosophical puzzle of Dion and Theon, exploring questions of identity, persistence, and mereological essentialism. This thought experiment challenges our understanding of what it means for an object to remain the same through transformations. The puzzle involves Dion, a person, and Theon, a proper part of Dion created by removing Dion's left foot. The author uses Wolfgang Schwarz's semantics to address the 'paradox of occasional identity'. Theon occupies the same region as Dion after the loss of the foot, creating a scenario in which two initially distinct entities seemingly become identical. The solution proposes that Dion and Theon, though initially overlapping but distinct, fuse into a single entity after the foot's annihilation. This is achieved by proposing an account of proper names that avoids commitment to occasional identity, arguing that Dion and Theon have 'become identical' without embracing controversial metaphysical doctrines. By applying a body-minus puzzle, The proposed solution contributes to ongoing debates about persistence, identity, and change.
Published in Philosophia, this paper is directly relevant to the journal's focus on general philosophy. Its exploration of identity, persistence, and mereological essentialism aligns with the journal's coverage of core philosophical concepts. By engaging with the work of prominent philosophers like Wolfgang Schwarz, the paper contributes to ongoing discussions within the field.
| Category | Category Repetition |
|---|---|
| Philosophy. Psychology. Religion: Philosophy (General) | 3 |