How much can we trust information from sources with conflicting goals? This research explores the complexities of belief justification when information comes from sources with known epistemic conflicts of interest. It challenges existing theories that either recommend avoiding such sources or ignoring the conflicts entirely, proposing a nuanced approach grounded in game theory. The analysis dives into the depths of belief and rationalization. Building on a game-theoretical framework, the author suggests that a hearer can rationally justify some beliefs based on testimony alone, even when aware of the speaker's conflicting epistemic goals. This justification relies on achieving an equilibrium concept over time, leading to beliefs that are less accurate than those held by the original source. However, these results highlight the importance of scientific norms and equilibrium mechanisms. Ultimately, this research sheds light on the role of scientific norms in fostering credibility and mitigating the impact of epistemic conflicts of interest. The findings emphasize the need for transparency and robust mechanisms to ensure the reliability of information, particularly in contexts where trust is paramount. Further development of such principles could lead to increased levels of trust.
This article on testimonial justification aligns with Synthese's focus on epistemology, logic, and the philosophy of science. The paper contributes to ongoing discussions about belief formation and the reliability of testimony. The use of game theory to model epistemic conflict adds a novel perspective, complementing the journal's commitment to exploring philosophical questions using formal and interdisciplinary methods.