Does seeing an object require visually differentiating it from its surroundings? This paper challenges the widely accepted 'differentiation condition' in philosophy, arguing that one cannot see an object unless one visually differentiates it from its immediate surroundings. By drawing on suggestions from Dretske (2007) and Gibson (2002 [1972]), the author articulates two 'principles of occlusion' that present a sceptical view on this condition. Each principle is examined for its plausibility and incompatibility with the differentiation condition, leading to a critical analysis of visual perception. The paper delves into the nuances of how we perceive objects and the role of differentiation in this process. To resolve the inconsistency, the author suggests abandoning the differentiation condition, proposing a shift in our understanding of visual perception. This research prompts a re-evaluation of fundamental concepts in philosophy of mind, offering a new perspective on how we visually interact with the world.
This paper's exploration of visual perception and the differentiation condition aligns with Synthese's focus on philosophy, particularly philosophy of mind and epistemology. By questioning a fundamental assumption about perception, the article contributes to the journal's ongoing discourse on the nature of knowledge and the relationship between mind and world.