Quine’s Two Dogmas as a Criticism of Logical Empiricism

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Koterski, Artur. “Quine’s Two Dogmas As a Criticism of Logical Empiricism”. Philosophia Scientae, no. 19-1, 2015, pp. 127-42, https://doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1046.
Koterski, A. (2015). Quine’s Two Dogmas as a Criticism of Logical Empiricism. Philosophia Scientae, 19-1, 127-142. https://doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1046
Koterski A. Quine’s Two Dogmas as a Criticism of Logical Empiricism. Philosophia Scientae. 2015;(19-1):127-42.
Journal Category
Philosophy
Psychology
Religion
Philosophy (General)
Refrences
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