Why are international institutions so diverse? This paper introduces a framework for understanding the variation in international institutions, arguing that design choices reflect rational attempts to solve cooperation problems. The authors propose the Rational Design project, identifying five key institutional features—membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility—and explaining their variation based on distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty. Drawing on rational choice theory, the research develops empirically testable conjectures that link cooperation problems to institutional design. The article serves as an introduction to a larger project evaluating these conjectures across various issue areas. By emphasizing the goal-seeking behavior of international actors, the study offers a valuable framework for analyzing the design and evolution of international institutions. The Rational Design approach provides insights into the challenges of international cooperation.
As a leading journal in international relations, International Organization provides a suitable platform for this theoretical framework. The paper’s focus on the design and function of international institutions directly addresses the journal’s core themes. Its exploration of rational choice theory and empirical testing aligns with the journal's methodological rigor.