Can mystical experiences be explained through natural means, or do they point to something more? This paper addresses Jerome Gellman's challenge to the author's claim that a naturalistic explanation for mystical experiences is available, arguing it's a better explanation than those suggesting God is perceived in such experiences. Gellman argues that some mystics don't fit sociological explanations, that sociological analysis of tribal mysticism can't extend to theistic experiences, and that mystical experiences deserve prima facie credence, putting the burden of proof on naturalists. The author counters that alleged counter-examples do fit the sociological explanation or are too poorly known to judge, that a theory supplemented by neurophysiological findings provides a strong explanation for all mystical experiences, and that the burden of proof now falls on the theist. By engaging with philosophical and neurophysiological perspectives, the study challenges traditional interpretations of mysticism and encourages a reevaluation of the relationship between science and spirituality.
Published in Religious Studies, this paper is relevant to the journal's focus on religions, mythology, and rationalism. By exploring whether science can explain mystical experiences, the paper directly engages with the intersection of religious phenomena and scientific inquiry, which contributes to the journal's broader exploration of religious and philosophical concepts.